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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Shane McKay appeals from the district court's order denying his petition
for post-conviction relief.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Underlyina Criminal Proceedinas
"While awaiting a court date for a previous arrest for driving under the
influence, and while driving with a suspended license, Shane McKay drove at an
estimated speed of seventy miles per hour in a thirty-five miles per hour zone
and struck a motorcycle from behind, killing the operator of the motorcycle."
State v. McKay, Docket No. 31652, 2006 Unpublished Opinion No. 727 (Idaho
App. Nov. 22, 2006), review denied January 12, 2007. The state charged McKay
with, and the jury convicted him of, vehicular manslaughter and the district court
imposed a unified ten-year sentence with four years fixed.

McKay, 2006

Unpublished Opinion No. 727, p.1. McKay filed a Rule 35 motion, which the
district court denied.

Id.

McKay appealed challenging the length of his sentence and the denial of
Rule 35 relief.
sentence.

The ldaho Court of Appeals affirmed McKay's conviction and

Id.at p.2.

The Remittitur issued on April 25, 2002, the same day the

ldaho Supreme Court denied McKay's petition for review. (File Folder in No.
31652.)

Course Of Post Conviction Proceedings
McKay, through counsel, filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging
(1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel based on trial counsel's failure to
request an instruction on "cause," and (2) ineffective assistance of appellate
counsel for failing to raise "any other issues on direct appeal" other than
excessive sentence and the district court's failure to grant Rule 35 relief. (R.,
Vol.1, pp.2-4.)

McKay further explained the nature of these claims in his

Memorandum in Support of Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief.
Specifically, McKay argued (1) trial counsel's failure to ask the district court to
give the pattern instruction for vehicular manslaughter, lCJl 709, or include
certain language from the pattern instruction in the elements instruction given to
the jury, was deficient and prejudicial because without such an instruction, the
jury was permitted to convict him of a "strict liability offense" (R., Vol. I, pp.16-19);
and (2) appellate counsel should have challenged the elements instruction on
direct appeal (R., Vol. I, pp.21-28).
The state filed an answer and a motion for summary dismissal of McKay's
petition under I.C. Fj 19-4906(c). (R., Vol. I, pp.43-45, 49-50; R., Vol. II, pp.137221.) McKay filed a "Cross-Motion for Summary Disposition" and supporting
memorandum. (R., Vol. !I, pp.222-31.) After hearing the parties' argument on
their cross-motions for summary disposition, the district court denied McKay's
petition for post-conviction relief and granted the state's motion for summary
dismissal, concluding McKay was not entitled to relief on either claim because

the elements instruction given was appropriate and actually increased the state's
burden of proof. (R., Vol. II, pp.241-42, 293-94; Tr., p.23, L.15 - p.31, L.6.)
McKay timely appealed. (R., Vol. 11, pp.283-84.)

ISSUE

McKay states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. McKay's
post-conviction application because the jury instructions omitted the
element of cause and that element was at issue?
(Opening Brief of Appellant, pp. 4-5.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has McKay failed to establish the district court erred in denying his petition
for post-conviction relief in light of McKay's failure to demonstrate that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial or on appeal?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Correctly Concluded McKav Was Not Entitled to Relief On
Either Of His Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims
A.

Introduction
McKay contends the district court erred in dismissing his petition for post-

conviction relief because, he argues, both trial and appellate counsel were
ineffective for failing to challenge the elements instruction given in his underlying
criminal case. (Opening Brief of Appellant, pp.5-19.) More specifically, McKay
complains that the elements instruction should have been challenged because it
deviated from the pattern instruction, ICJl 709, in such a way that it allowed the
jury to convict him without requiring the state to prove adequate causation.
(Opening Brief of Appellant, pp.5-12.) McKay's claim fails because the elements
instruction was not misleading or prejudicial and there was no basis for
challenging the instruction at trial or on appeal. As a result, McKay cannot
establish either of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel.
B.

Standard Of Review
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a

preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which his claim is based.
Estes v. State, 111 ldaho 430, 436, 725 P.2d 135, 141 (1986); Clark v. State, 92
ldaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); I.C.R. 57(c). An appellate court will
disturb the findings of fact only if they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review
the conclusions of law drawn by the district court from those facts. Mitchell v.
!3&te,

132 ldaho 274, 276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998). If the district court

has not made explicit factual findings, the appellate court will extrapolate the
implicit findings from the record and uphold them unless they are shown to be
clearly erroneous.

State v. Whiteley, 124 ldaho 261,268, 858 P.2d 800, 807

(Ct. App. 1993). A trial court's decision that a post-conviction petitioner has not
met his burden of proof is entitled to great weight. Sanders v. State, 117 ldaho
939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 965 (Ct. App. 1990); Larkin v. State, 115 ldaho 72, 74,
764 P.2d 439,441 (Ct. App. 1988).
C.

Standards Governing Claims Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel
To be entitled to relief on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

post-conviction petitioner must satisfy the two prong test set forth by the United
States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The
petitioner must demonstrate that ( I ) counsel's performance fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness and that (2) there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceedings would have
been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. The Strickland standard applies
to both trial and appellate counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985); Mitchell
v. State, 132 ldaho 274, 276, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). The relevant inquiry on
the prejudice prong in relation to appellate counsel is whether there is a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the petitioner would have
prevailed on appeal. Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285 (2000).
A reviewing court evaluates counsel's performance at the time of the
alleged error, not in hindsight, and presumes ''trial counsel was competent and
that trial tactics were based on sound legal strategy." State v. Porter, 130 ldaho

772, 791-92, 948 P.2d 127, 146-47 (1997). Trial counsel's strategic and tactical
decisions will not be second-guessed on review or serve as a basis for postconviction relief under a claim of ineffective counsel unless the UPCPA petitioner
has shown that the decision resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of
the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. Giles v.

State, 125 ldaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994); Cunninaham v. State, 117
ldaho 428, 430-31, 788 P.2d 243, 245-46 (Ct. App. 1990). "The constitutional
requirement for effective assistance of counsel is not the key to the prison for a
defendant who can dredge up a long series of examples of how the case might
have been tried better." lvev v. State, 123 ldaho 77, 80, 844 P.2d 706, 709
(1992).
D.

McKay Has Failed To Establish He Received Ineffective Assistance Of
Counsel From Either Trial Or Appellate Counsel
McKay complains both trial and appellate counsel were ineffective for

failing to challenge the elements instruction given at trial on the ground that the
instruction failed to include the words "in an unlawful manner" and "significant,"
which are included in the pattern instruction, lCJl 709. Both of McKay's claims
fail because the instruction did not mislead the jury or otherwise prejudice
McKay. Indeed, the instruction given elevated the state's burden of proof with
respect to cause.
Whether an attorney is ineffective for failing to challenge jury instructions
depends on whether the instructions contained errors. Brown v. State, 137 ldaho
529, 533, 50 P.3d 1024, 1028 (Ct. App. 2002). Jury instructions contain errors

when they fail, as a whole, to fairly and adequately present the issues and state

;.dI State v. Zichko, 129 ldaho 259, 264, 923 P.2d 966, 971
the applicable law.
(1996); State v. Canelo, 129 ldaho 386, 391, 924 P.2d 1230, 1235 (Ct. App.
1996). To be reversible error, any error in the jury instructions must have misled
the jury or prejudiced the complaining party. State v. Row, 131 ldaho 303, 310,
955 P.2d 1082, 1089 (1998);

m,137 ldaho at 533, 50 P.3d at 1028. Where,

as here, a petitioner alleges that counsel was ineffective for failing to request an
instruction, the petitioner must demonstrate not only that the instructions given
were inadequate (deficient performance), but also that there is a reasonable
probability that the jury's verdict would have been different had the proposed
instruction been given (prejudice).

m,137 ldaho at 534, 50 P.3d at 1029.

Applying these standards to the facts of this case reveals that McKay failed to
establish he received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial or on appeal.
1.

ldaho Criminal Jury Instruction 709 -Vehicular Manslaughter

The pattern criminal jury instruction for vehicular manslaughter states:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular
Manslaughter, the state must prove each of the following:
1.

On or about [date]

2.

in the state of ldaho

3.
the defendant [name], while operating a motor vehicle
committed the unlawful act of [description of misdemeanor or
infraction] [driving while under the influence of alcohol]; [and]
14.

the unlawful act was committed with gross negligence; and]

[4] 151. The defendant's operation of the motor vehicle in such
unlawful manner was a significant cause contributing to the death
of [name of decedent(@].
You are further instructed that the unlawful act of [insert
description of misdemeanor or infraction] [driving while under the
influence of alcohol] is committed when all of the following are
found to exist:
[Insert elements from statute or other instructions]
If the state has failed to prove any of the above, you must
find the defendant not guilty. If you unanimously find that the state
has proven each of the above, including each component of the
unlawful act of [insert description of misdemeanor or infraction]
[driving while under the influence of alcohol] beyond a reasonable
doubt, then you must find the defendant guilty of vehicular
manslaughter.
(ICJI 709 (brackets in original).)
2.

The Jun/ Instruction Given In This Case On The Elements Of
Vehicular Manslaughter

The state charged McKay with vehicular manslaughter in violation of I.C.
§§ 18-4006(3)(b) and 18-4007(3)(a) and specifically alleged McKay committed

the offense "by operating a motor vehicle .

.

. under the influence of alcohol

andlor with a blood alcohol content in excess of .08, or 18-8006, IdahoCode [sic]
which caused [Ted Cox's] death." (#31652 R., Vol. I, pp.69-70.) Section 184006(3)(b), I.C., defines vehicular manslaughter as:
18-4006. Manslaughter defined. - Manslaughter is the unlawful
killing of a human being including, but not limited to, a human
embryo or fetus, without malice. It is of three (3) kinds:

3. Vehicular - in which the operation of a motor vehicle is a
significant cause contributing to the death because of:

(b) the commission of a violation of section 18-8004 or 18-8006,
ldaho Code .. .
Section 18-8006, I.C., provides, in relevant part, "Any person causing
great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement to any
person other than himself in committing, a violation of the provisions of section
18-8004(1)(a) or (l)(c), ldaho Code," is guilty of aggravated driving under the
influence.

I.C.

3

18-8006(1). Section 18-8004(1)(a)', I.C., in turn makes it

unlawful "to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this
state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private
property open to the public," while "under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any
other intoxicating substances . . . or who has an alcohol concentration of 0.08 . . .
or more . . .."

Thus, in order to prove McKay was guilty of vehicular

manslaughter pursuant to I.C.

3

184006(3)(b), the state was required to prove

McKay was operating his car in violation of I.C.

3

18-8004(1)(a) and the

operation of his vehicle in that manner was a "significant cause contributing" to
Ted's death.
Accordingly, at trial, the court instructed the jury on the elements of
vehicular manslaughter as follows:
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Vehicular
Manslaughter, as charged in the information, the state must prove
each of the following beyond a reasonable doubt:

'

Sections 18-8004(1)(a) and 18-8004(1)(c), I.C., are essentially identical with the
exception of the type of vehicle driven - (a) applies to motor vehicles whereas (c)
applies to commercial motor vehicles. The provisions of I.C. 3 18-8004(1)(a)
apply to this case because McKay was driving a personal vehicle, not a
commercial motor vehicle.

1.

On or about the 5'h day of October, 2003,

2.

In the state of Idaho, Canyon County,

3.
the defendant, Shane McKay, drove or was in actual
physical control of

4.

a motor vehicle

upon a highway, street or bridge or upon public or private
5.
property open to the public,
6.

while under the influence of alcohol

while having an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more as shown by
analysis of defendant's blood,
and the defendant's operation of the motor vehicle caused
the death of Ted Cox.

7.

If any of the above has not been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant not guilty. If
each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt,
you must find the defendant guilty.
(R., Vol. I,p.68 (Instruction No. 201A) (emphasis in original).)

3.

McKay Has Failed To Establish Trial Counsel Was Deficient In
Failing To Obiect To The Vehicular Manslaushter Instruction

On appeal, McKay argues that trial counsel was ineffective because he
"fail[ed] to argue that the district court erred" in giving an elements instruction on
vehicular manslaughter that did not include the words "in such unlawful manner"
or "significant," which are used in ICJl 709. (Opening Brief of Appellant, pp.612.) McKay's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim fails because trial
counsel, in fact, requested the "in such an unlawful manner" language and his

failure to include "significant" in his proposed instruction was beneficial to McKay
in that the failure to include "significant" actually raised the state's burden.
The proposed elements instruction submitted by trial counsel did include
the language "in an unlawful manner." The proposed instruction reads:
In order for the defendant to be found guilty of Vehicular
Manslaughter, the state must prove each of the following:
I

On or about the 5thday of October, 2003;

2.

In Canyon County, State of ldaho;

3.
The Defendant, Shane McKay, while operating a
motor vehicle committed the unlawful act of driving while under the
influence of alcohol; and
the operation of the motor vehicle in an unlawful
4.
manner caused the death of Theodore Cox.
You are further instructed that the unlawful act of driving
while under the influence of alcohol is committed when all of the
following are found to exist:
1.

That on or about October 5, 2003;

2.

In Canyon County, State of ldaho;

3.
The defendant, Shane McKay, was driving, or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle;

Upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or
4.
private property open to the public;
While under the influence of alcohol and/or who has
5.
an alcohol concentration of .08 or more as shown by an analysis of
his blood. urine or breath.
(R., Vol. I, pp.85-86 (emphasis added).)
Because counsel requested the "in an unlawful manner" language McKay
claims he was entitled to, McKay cannot establish ineffective assistance of trial

counsel on this basis. That the court ultimately did not instruct the jury as
requested by counsel is not an ineffective assistance of claim. Rather, it is a
substantive claim that should have been raised on direct appeal and, as such, is
precluded from consideration in post-conviction.

I.C. § 19-4901 ("Any issue

which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may
not be considered in post-conviction proceedings . . ..")
McKay has likewise failed to establish that trial counsel's failure to request
the "significant cause" language in his proposed instruction was ineffective
because, as noted by the district court, the language requested by trial counsel,
and given by the district court, actually increased the state's burden by requiring
the state to prove that McKay's act of driving under the influence caused Ted's
death, rather than just proving it was a "significant cause contributing to" his
death, as stated in lCJl 709.
McKay nevertheless challenges the district court's conclusion, claiming
"the jury could have interpreted 'caused' to mean 'a cause"' rather than "the
cause," which, he contends would have "permitted the jury to find Mr. McKay
guilty if it concluded his operation of the motor vehicle was a factor contributing to
the cause of death." (Opening Brief of Appellant, pp.11-12.) McKay's claim fails.
The plain, ordinary meaning of "caused" and the definition of "caused" is "to be

the cause of; bring about." WEBSTER'SNEWWORLDDICTIONARY
AND THESAURUS
93 (1996) (emphasis added).

It is presumed that jurors interpret words of

common usage in the sense in which they are generally understood. See State
v. Caldwell, 140 Idaho 740, 741, I 0 1 P.3d 233, 234 (Ct. App. 2004), review

denied, (citations omitted). As such, it should be presumed that the jury in
McKay's criminal case interpreted the elements instruction as requiring it to find,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that McKay's unlawful act of driving under the
influence was the cause of Ted's death not just "a factor contributing to" the
cause of death, as argued by McKay.
McKay's argument that the legislative history for the vehicular
manslaughter statute somehow renders the language of the jury instruction
confusing is without merit.

In 1997, the legislature amended the vehicular

manslaughter statute as follows:
18-4006. MANSLAUGHTER DEFINED. Manslaughter is the
unlawful killing of a human being, without malice. It is of three (3)
kinds:
3.

Vehicular - - in which the operation of a motor vehicle
is a sianificant cause contributing to the death because of:

1997 ldaho Sess. Laws, ch. 103, § 1, p.244.'
The introductory language to the amendment reads: "AN ACT RELATING
TO MANSLAUGHTER; AMENDING SECTION 18-4006, IDAHO CODE, TO
REDEFINE VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER BY PROVIDING A BROADER
STANDARD OF PROOF" (id.) and the Statement of Purpose accompanying the
amendment provides:
This legislation is intended to clarify the definition of vehicular
manslaughter contained in ldaho Code, Section 18-4006. The
The legislature amended I.C. $ 18-4006 again in 2002 to add the language
"including, but not limited to, a human embryo or fetus," in the definition of
manslaughter. 2002 ldaho Sess. Laws, ch. 330, 5 2, p.936.

statute as it presently reads has created confusion and resulted in
inconsistent interpretations amongst trial judges as well as juries.
The proposed change will make it clear that driving under the
influence may still result in a finding of guilt for vehicular
manslaughter even though other causes, such as weather or
lighting, may have in some way contributed to a motor vehicle
accident which resulted in death.
H.B. 143, Statement of Purpose.
McKay argues the legislature's acknowledgement of "inconsistent
interpretations" in relation to the statute's use of the word "causes" supports his
claim that "the jury could have interpreted 'caused' to mean 'a cause' and that
interpretation permitted the jury to find Mr. McKay guilty if it concluded his
operation of the motor vehicle was a factor contributing to the cause of death."
(Opening Brief of Appellant, p.12.) The mere fact that there were "inconsistent
interpretations" of the word "causes" prior to the amendment does not establish
that McKay's interpretation is a reasonable or even likely one. To the contrary,
the introductory language to the amendment noting the intent to provide a
"broader standard of proof," and that portion of the Statement of Purpose
"mak[ing] it clear that driving under the influence may still result in a finding of
guilt for vehicular manslaughter even though other causes such as weather or
lighting may have in some way contributed to a motor vehicle accident which
resulted in death," indicates judges and juries were interpreting "causes" to
preclude a conviction where "other causes . . . may have in some way
contributed." While that particular interpretation of "causes" is understandable
and reasonable, McKay's interpretation, which is the exact opposite, is not.

4.

McKav Has Failed To Establish Appellate Counsel Was Deficient
For Failing To Challenge The Vehicular Manslauahter Instruction
On Appeal

McKay also claims appellate counsel was deficient for "failing to argue that
the vehicular manslaughter instruction constituted fundamental error." (Opening
Brief of Appellant, p.15.) McKay's claim fails for two reasons.
First, with respect to McKay's argument that the jury instruction should
have included the words "significant cause" rather than "caused," appellate
counsel was precluded from raising such an argument for the first time on appeal
given that McKay's proposed elements instruction also used the word "caused"
rather than significant cause. Thus, any error in the instruction in relation to that
particular word was invited and cannot be considered on appeal even under the
doctrine of fundamental error. State v. Walters, 120 ldaho 46, 60, 813 P.2d 857,
871 (1990) ("Since the defense counsel made a conscious decision not to object,
any claim of error, fundamental or otherwise, was invited and cannot be the basis
for a claim of error on appeal.") (citations omitted); State v. Caudill, 109 ldaho
222, 226, 706 P.2d 456, 460 (1985) ("We will not reverse for the reason that one
may not successfully complain of errors one has consented to or acquiesced in.
In other words, invited errors are not reversible.")
Second, appellate counsel was not deficient in failing to challenge the
vehicular manslaughter instruction because it did not include the words "in such
unlawful manner" because the absence of those words did not render the
instruction incorrect, mislead the jury or otherwise prejudice McKay.

McKay

claims otherwise, arguing, by omitting the phrase "in such unlawful manner," "the

jury was not required to link Mr. McKay's culpable conduct with the death of Mr.
Cox and the state was relieved of its burden to prove every element of the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt." (Opening Brief of Appellant, pp.10-I I.)
To the contrary, the instruction given clearly advised the jury the state was
required to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that McKay's "operation of the
motor vehicle" "while under the influence of alcohol

while having an alcohol

concentration of 0.08 or more as shown by analysis of defendant's blood"
"caused the death of Ted Cox." (R., Vol. I, p.68 (Instruction No. 201A (emphasis
in original).) This is only an incorrect statement of the law in that it imposes a
greater burden on the state because it required proof that McKay's "culpable
conduct," i.e., driving under the influence, was the cause of Ted's death rather
than a "significant factor contributing to" Ted's death. As such, the instruction
was not prejudicjal or misleading and it did not, as McKay claims, relieve the
state from proving McKay's culpable conduct was "linked" to Ted's death.
5.

McKav Has Failed To Establish He Was Prejudiced By Either
Attornev's Failure To Challenge The Vehicular Manslauqhter
Instruction

McKay has also failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by counsels'
failure to challenge the vehicular manslaughter instruction not only because the
instruction given actually increased the state's burden but because the evidence
at trial established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that McKay's unlawful act of
driving under the influence "was a significant cause contributing to" Ted's death.
McKay was driving erratically at a high rate of speed, at one point crossing
into the lane of oncoming traffic, right before he plowed into Ted's motorcycle,

which had slowed down in order to cross some railroad tracks. (#31652 Tr.,
p.144, L.14 - p.146, L.24, p.181, L.12 - p.182, L.18, p.391, Ls.8-19, p.404, L.19

-

p.405, L.2, p.576, Ls.10-17, p.581, I

-

1 p.583, Ls.1-5, p.588, Ls.8-25,

p.589, Ls.15-24.) When police responded to the accident, they noticed McKay
appeared to be under the influence of alcohol. (#31652 Tr., p.325, Ls.17-19,
p.326, Ls.2-8, p.480, Ls.21-24.) McKay's speech was slurred, his eyes were
glassy and bloodshot, and he smelled of alcohol. (#31652 Tr., p.326, Ls.10-13,
p.480, Ls.14-20.)

McKay admitted drinking (#31652 Tr., p.485, Ls.1-3) and

testing revealed his blood alcohol content was . I 5 (#31652 Tr., p.504, Ls.24-25),
nearly twice the legal limit. I.C. § 18-8004(l)(a).
McKay nevertheless claims he was prejudiced by the jury instruction
because, he contends, "[slufficient evidence was introduced at trial from which
the jury could have found that Mr. Cox did not have an operational taillight and
that Mr. McKay's commission of DUI did not cause Mr. Cox's death." (Opening
Brief of Appellant, p.14.) McKay's argument fails because whether Ted's taillight
was malfunctioning does not mean the jury would have concluded McKay's
unlawful act of driving under the influence was not a "significant cause
contributing" to Ted's death. Indeed, the evidence at trial indicates otherwise.
Moreover, the evidence that Ted's taillight was not working is suspect and
was contradicted by eyewitness testimony. The only evidence McKay offered to
support his argument that Ted's taillight was not working was that of a hired
expert, Brant Freeman, who claimed Ted's motorcycle had no taillight because if
there was a taillight he would have expected to "find a small speck or something

of that plastic taillight lens embedded into the radiator or something like that," but
did not.

(#31652 Tr., p.705, Ls.8-11.) Freeman's testimony was, however,

contradicted by Monique Crownhart, Michael Warren, and Scott Paulson, who
were with Ted that night he was killed and testified that Ted's motorcycle had a
functioning taillight just prior to the accident. (#31652 Tr., p.168, L . l
L . l l , p.209, L.17 - p.214, L.6, p.261, L.21

-

p.264, L.24.)

- p.176,

Furthermore,

Freeman's testimony about how the accident occurred was contradicted by two
other accident reconstructionists - Fred Rice (#31652 Tr., pp.559-593, pp.820828) and Edward Robertson (#31652 Tr., pp.745-795).
In light of the evidence presented, there is no reasonable probability that
McKay would have been acquitted had the jury been provided with an instruction
which included "in such unlawful manner" or "significant cause." The state clearly
proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that McKay's unlawful act of driving under
the influence was a significant cause contributing to Ted's death.
Having failed to show either deficient performance or resulting prejudice
on the part of trial or appellate counsel in relation to the vehicular manslaughter
instruction, McKay has also failed to show any basis for reversal of the district
court's order denying his request for post-conviction relief.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order denying post-conviction relief
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